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Abstract 
Why does air traffic control still rely on paper control strips? Is paper safer? This 
question has been dealt with before, and responses have pointed out that "paper 
has helped to shape work practices, and work practices have been designed around 
the use of paper" (Harper & Sellen 1995: 2). The present contribution tries to fur-
ther specify these claims. At first, the use of paper as a medium of representation in 
the course of dealing with critical situations will be discussed. Drawing on ethno-
graphic fieldwork carried out in two European Upper Area Control centres, prac-
tices linked to the puzzling persistence of the paper strip are then captured along 
with different types of critical situations. Extending the observation of practices to 
meso- and macro-levels, it can be shown that paper strips are multiply embedded. 
They help to stabilise cycles of practices, the permanent reproduction of which is 
critical to air safety. 
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1 Introduction 
Air traffic control relies on local activi-
ties carried out in regional control cen-
tres. These centres are faced with a 
major problem of coordination: It is 
their mission to handle "conflicts", 
which may lead to the mid-air collision 
of aircrafts. In order to contribute to 
the securing of air safety, they draw on 
two different sorts of information. 
First, they are provided with anticipa-
tory information generated by a central 
(European) flight planning unit on 
flight routes to be taken by aircraft. 
This information is made visible on 
flight strips. Second, control centres 
are equipped with radar screens, which 
display the actual movements of semi-
autonomous aircraft within a circum-
scribed geographical sector. The situ-
ated practices of mediating between 
the orders of events, as prescribed and 
observed in real time, have been a sub-
ject of numerous ethnographic field 
studies. More or less rooted in the eth-
nomethodological tradition (Suchman 
1987, 1993), air traffic control centres 
may even be said to be one of the 
seminal cases for an approach known 
as Workplace Studies. Starting in the 
late 1980s, in-depth field studies have 
been carried out in a number of Euro-
pean countries, most notably in the UK 
(Harper et al. 1989, Harper & Hughes 
1993), in France (Gras et al. 1994), and 
in Sweden (Sanne 1999). Drawing on 
ethnographic fieldwork carried out in 
the Upper Area Control centres of Re-
ims (France, March 2001) and 
Karlsruhe (Germany, April and Octo-
ber 2001), the present article contrib-
utes to this corpus of research.1
If the case of air traffic control has at-
tracted attention and gained promi-
nence beyond a highly specialised re-
                                                             
1 I would like to thank air traffic control 
staff at these centres for their reception and 
interviewees at various divisions of ATC 
(air traffic control) organisations for ac-
cepting being interviewed. Also, I am grate-
ful for the criticisms and comments by two 
anonymous reviews on an earlier version of 
this paper. 
search community, this is because of 
the flight control strip and its unlikely 
persistence: Why is it that air traffic 
control still relies on paper strips?2 Is 
paper safer (Mackay 2000)? In order 
to seriously address this question, a 
few details on the use of flight strips 
must be presented. Flight strips meas-
uring 13,5 cm by 2,5 cm are printed out 
about 20 minutes before an aircraft 
enters the geographical sector a control 
team is in charge of. Each of them is 
put on a plastic support and then 
placed on a rack, which contains as 
many strips as there are aircraft al-
ready in the sector and due to arrive in 
the sector. A "control team" is com-
posed of two controllers working next 
to each other. 
Figure 1: Flight strip as used by the Upper 
Area Control Centre of Karlsruhe, Germany 
(source: Milde 2007)3
Flight strips contain a wide range of 
information. To start from the centre, 
"VC 4751" indicates the flight code. It 
states that the aircraft is operated by 
"Voyageur Airlines". Directly above, 
the type of aircraft is identified: "A321" 
is for "Airbus 321". The upper line of 
the right column provides information 
on the origin (Munich, "EDDM") and 
the destination (Paris Charles-de-
Gaulle; "LFPG") of the flight. Split up 
between the third row in the left col-
umn and the last row down in the right 
                                                             
2 The French popular science magazine La 
Recherche has regularly covered this issue 
(for instance issue no. 319, April 1999, pp. 
52-70). The paper strip serves as a display 
case of what has been called the "myth of 
the paperless office" (Gladwell 2002). In a 
more recent Business Week cover story, 
paper strips are used to illustrate the 
anachronistic technical infrastructure re-
sponsible for dramatic bottlenecks in a fast 
expanding world of air transport (Palmeri 
& Epstein 2007: 52). 
3 With the exception of the centre of Maas-
tricht, all area control centres in charge of 
the upper part of the German airspace rely 
on paper strips. 
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column, the flight strip denotes that 
the aircraft will enter the sector at 9.49 
am ("0949") and leave at 9.53 am 
("0953"). Within the sector, flight VC 
4751 will have to pass two points of 
intersection named "TALAL" and 
"ALB" (left column). There is one min-
ute of flight between these points of 
intersection, and three minutes before 
the aircraft is handed over to the adja-
cent sector in charge of another Ger-
man control centre situated in Langen 
("LANGI"). Scheduled to reach a cruis-
ing level of 32,000 feet ("320" right 
half of the second column), the aircraft 
has entered the area covered by the 
Karlsruhe centre of control at an alti-
tude of 19,000 feet ("190"). The centre 
of Langen expects it to be handed over 
at an altitude of 26, 000 feet ("260", 
bottom right of second column). Now, 
if there were a second control strip 
announcing a second aircraft for one of 
the points of intersections at the same 
time and same altitude, the controller 
would be left with some 20 minutes to 
"coordinate" this situation of "conflict". 
A possible solution might be to call the 
pilot of the first aircraft to change alti-
tude. Having received confirmation by 
the pilot, the controller would then 
take a pencil to cross out "190" and 
write down the "coordinated" altitude 
on the paper strip instead. 
In effect, the example on how control-
lers use flight strips while coordinating 
"conflicts" has only been provided for 
purposes of introduction and illustra-
tion. It serves to illustrate the approach 
taken by Workplace Studies. Having 
accumulated a larger number of obser-
vations on the many ways paper strips 
are used and manipulated by control-
lers, Richard Harper and Abigail Sellen 
have pointed out that paper-based con-
trol strips have physical properties 
difficult to replace by other media of 
representation. They conclude that 
"paper has helped to shape work prac-
tices, and work practices have been 
designed around the use of paper" 
(Harper & Sellen 1995: 2). While both 
claims have become commonplace 
within Workplace Studies and adjacent 
areas of research, I will argue that both 
claims are – still – waiting for specifi-
cation. In order to explain why it is so 
difficult to divorce practices of air traf-
fic control from paper strips, the pre-
sent contribution suggests taking three 
steps of analysis. The first step (section 
2) is to theorise the use of paper in 
terms of a medium of representation in 
the course of dealing with more and 
less critical situations. The problem of 
representation of both accidents and 
normal operation needs to be theoreti-
cally reflected; and this reflection goes 
beyond the habits and the present cor-
pus of Workplace Studies. In a second 
step (section 3), I will turn to the em-
pirical level of the analysis and present 
the issue of the paper strip in its organ-
isational contexts, including that of the 
collaborative research project the pre-
sent contribution draws on. This is a 
necessary prerequisite to specify prac-
tices, which have co-evolved with the 
use of paper strips (section 4). It is the 
analytical distinction of the "cyclical" 
nature of practices, which helps to 
identify practices of different scale and 
scope. This extension of the notion of 
practices to meso- and macro-level 
observations may be seen as an 
achievement in itself. In addition, it 
prepares for a return to the problem of 
representing normal operations, which 
has been theoretically reflected in a 
previous section. The conclusion 
reached in this study (section 5) is that 
paper strips are multiply embedded. 
They help to stabilise cycles of prac-
tices, the permanent reproduction of 
which is critical to air safety. 
2 Organisational ethnogra-
phy: the active production 
of safety 
This section discusses a shift in the 
understanding of safety. If safety is 
identified with the absence of acci-
dents, the representation of critical 
situations is (nothing but) a matter of 
hindsight. A perspective, which high-
lights the active production of safety, 
in contrast, requires examining the 
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role of different media of representa-
tion and the way they are linked to 
specific practices. Here, I chart how 
the latter view has emerged from the 
former, which prepares the ground for 
subsequent empirical analyses. 
Dealing with technical failures and 
accidents, social studies of technology 
and risk have often highlighted that 
their representation is a matter of 
hindsight. It would therefore be simply 
erroneous to think that accident repre-
sentations established post hoc provide 
significant information on the condi-
tions facing the operators in a situation 
of crisis. The problem of hindsight per-
sists regardless of whether technical 
systems have been equipped with fail-
ure-proof technologies of recording 
and conserving accident data. Even 
black boxes containing flight data and 
cockpit voice recorders which are de-
signed to withstand the crash of an 
aircraft sometimes fail or do not con-
tain reliable data on the course of an 
accident (Potthast 2006). If there is a 
single major achievement in the social 
sciences within the area of risk re-
search, it is the way in which the idea 
of a perfectly neutral medium allowing 
for unquestionable representations of 
accidents has been challenged. This is 
why the "black box" has enjoyed par-
ticular attention in this area of re-
search and has even become a meta-
phor to characterise its constructivist 
approach. At some point, "opening the 
black box" had become a standard ana-
lytical operation. While this has unde-
niably helped to integrate a social sci-
ence approach to the study of technol-
ogy and risk, its success may have 
caused the demise of its analytical 
power. According to the critical diag-
nosis of Langdon Winner, constructiv-
ist research on technology and risk had 
become irrelevant as early as the 
1990s, restricting itself to a critical 
gesture of repeatedly "opening the 
black box and finding it empty" (Win-
ner 1993). 
In the past, sociological research has 
struggled to capture "accidents" as a 
legitimate object of inquiry.4 However, 
social studies of technology and risk 
have flourished, not content to focus 
on a ritualised questioning of hindsight 
(of accident representations). In the 
following, I will discuss some ap-
proaches that have escaped a narrow 
conception of accidents and developed 
an alternative view on how to deal with 
critical situations. Among the ap-
proaches which have somehow man-
aged to deactivate the problem of hind-
sight, one has to mention the work by 
Charles Perrow. His book on "normal 
accidents" (Perrow 1984) has had a 
major impact as it shifted from viewing 
accidents as single events to their inner 
dynamics. Having discovered that 
technical failures and breakdowns fol-
lowed different sequential patterns, 
Perrow launched a comparative re-
search program on different technolo-
gies. Once reconceived of as sequences 
of events rather than indivisible events, 
accidents can be shown to leave more 
or less scope and time for interpreta-
tion and intervention by users and 
operators. According to Perrow's con-
clusion, this scope for diagnosis and 
reaction depends on the objective 
characteristics of technical systems. 
Following this account, the problem of 
hindsight can no longer be generalised 
and may be reformulated. Hindsight is 
a matter of degree, depending on dif-
ferent types of system design. Read as 
a strategy to tackle the problem of 
hindsight and to capture accidents as 
an object for sociological inquiry, Per-
row's study has three implications, 
which have become signposts for sub-
sequent research. First, the problem of 
post hoc representation has been 
specified in terms of its recipients. 
                                                             
4 According to Judith Green, "sociology has 
largely ignored accidents as a legitimate 
object of study. This (…) neglect is not mere 
coincidence but an inevitable outcome of 
the ways in which accidents have been 
constructed. When they have been studied, 
accidents have been redefined as 'non-
accidental'" (Green 1997: 15). 
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Hindsight is not a problem to an ab-
stract observer or the imagined general 
public but to the operators of technical 
systems. Second, the notion of hind-
sight is re-defined. Only if leaving no 
room for interventions, representa-
tions of accidents are counted as repre-
sentations with hindsight. Third, the 
definition of accidents is extended to 
potential accidents or accidents which 
have been prevented. 
Developing independently of the "nor-
mal accident approach", there has been 
a second stream of research originating 
from a North American campus, which 
has succeeded to by-pass the problem 
of hindsight. Its focus is on "highly 
reliable organisations", or "HRO"; that 
is organisations which run risky tech-
nical systems often without ever hav-
ing produced an accident (La Porte & 
Consolini 1991, Rochlin 1993). Accord-
ing to the HRO approach, this out-
standing performance of actively pro-
ducing safety requires explanation. By 
implication, safety is no longer defined 
as the absence of severe accidents. In 
accordance with the adherents to HRO, 
who claim that this is a poor and pas-
sive understanding of safety (Rochlin 
1999: 10, 2003), the central question is 
no longer "how do organisations pre-
vent that accidents occur?", but rather 
"how do organisations deploy which 
modes of representation in order to 
anticipate accidents?"5
This is a tricky question if one takes 
into account that control room person-
nel relies on representations of techni-
cal failures, which are themselves ex-
                                                             
5 For an overview on the HRO approach, 
see Roberts (1993). Air traffic control has 
been among the first and favourite objects 
of inquiry of this approach (La Porte 1988). 
For more recent publications taking a simi-
lar perspective, see Vaughan (2005) on air 
traffic control and Bourrier (1999, 2001) 
and Perin (2005) on controlling and main-
taining nuclear power stations. A major 
study on air traffic control based on long 
term ethnography and some 180 interviews 
in four air traffic control centres in the US 
is underway and carried out by Diane 
Vaughan. 
posed to technical failure. This phe-
nomenon, referred to as second order 
failure (Hirschhorn 1984), calls for 
differentiation of the notion of break-
down and failure, which is highly rele-
vant to the case of air traffic control. As 
illustrated by the subsequent sections, 
air traffic controllers cannot directly 
access first order failures. They live in 
a virtual environment, fully dependent 
on media of representation, and are 
therefore exposed to second order fail-
ures. Given this dependence, one has 
to take a closer look at how the respec-
tive representations are used to antici-
pate and respond to critical situations. 
To attribute primacy to any single me-
dium of representation would be un-
founded. This will be strikingly illus-
trated by the case of air traffic control 
(to be introduced in the following sec-
tion). This empirical case emphasises 
that the analytical challenge consists in 
capturing the coexistence of different 
"medialities" having diverse proper-
ties. Rejecting the idea of an a priori 
convergence of media, one needs to 
search for an alternative way to explain 
why technical systems are operated 
reliably, despite their management 
being divided up between different 
media. 
In the field of social studies of technol-
ogy, many authors have argued in fa-
vour of a "difference of media" hy-
pothesis (Latour 1991, 1996, Rammert 
1998, Schüttpelz 2006, Strübing 
2006). Many of these contributions, 
however, have failed to provide em-
pirical analyses along with a challeng-
ing theoretical program. In order to 
cover this research lacuna, I have sug-
gested focusing on breakdowns or ac-
cidents waiting to happen, thereby 
transforming the normal operation of 
technology into a more exotic species 
(Potthast 2007). Studying how organi-
sations cope with breakdowns and 
failures, "normal" operations appear 
less orderly. "Accidents and their sub-
sequent inquiries are perhaps the only 
passing moment when outsiders may 
glimpse the routinely less orderly, less 
rule-controlled world of technology 
 
52 STI Studies 2008: 47-68 
 
and science. However, because it is 
seen this way only around accidents, 
the belief is consolidated that normally 
practices are more orderly" (Wynne 
1988: 150). Ethnographic analyses of 
normal operations have to keep acci-
dents at an analytical distance. Other-
wise, analysts would fall back into an 
explanatory scheme opposing rules 
(explaining normal operation) and 
exceptions (explaining accidents, 
thereby confirming the primacy of 
rules), which cannot be taken for 
granted. Technical systems are oper-
ated by highly specialised experts who 
have often developed remarkable skills 
and routines in coping with critical 
situations. However, in building up 
these routines, communities of prac-
tice contribute to shift the definition of 
rules (Vaughan 1996, 2002). In short: 
"[p]ractices do not follow rules; rather, 
rules follow evolving practices" 
(Wynne 1988: 153). By consequence, it 
may be deviations from the rule, toler-
ated by a community of practice, which 
contribute to reliably operating techni-
cal systems (Ortmann 2003). At the 
same time, tolerating deviations from 
the rule may lead to the emergence of 
practical rules. This line of argument 
has allowed for an alternative account 
of accidents and incidents. There may 
be accidents although everyone in-
volved in the process has stuck to the 
(emergent set of practical) rules. 
"Working in practice but not in theory" 
(La Porte & Consolini 1991)? Con-
fronted with accidents which cannot be 
accounted for in terms of a violation of 
rules? Faced with the reliability of 
normal operations which cannot be 
explained other than in terms of violat-
ing rules? Given these paradoxes, I 
suggest to abandon the focus on "acci-
dents". Instead of taking rules and 
their exceptions for granted, I will 
rather speak of "critical situations" 
which need to be approached by means 
of ethnographic inquiry.  
Taking the problem of hindsight as a 
point of departure, the present section 
has theorised on the status of (differ-
ent) media of representation for ex-
plaining the reliable operation of com-
plex and risky technical systems. This 
reflection has gone beyond the current 
corpus of Workplace Studies in order 
to prepare for a more specific explana-
tion of a puzzling empirical phenome-
non: Why is it so difficult to divorce 
practices of air traffic control from 
paper strips? I will now turn to the 
empirical level of analysis. The follow-
ing section puts the paper strip in its 
broader organisational contexts and 
retraces a recent chapter in the long 
history of its failed replacement. Con-
trasting this story of failed research 
and development efforts based mainly 
on interviews and documentary analy-
ses, I will then draw on in-depth eth-
nographic observations in order to 
specify practices, which have co-
evolved with the use of a specific me-
dium of representation (section 4). 
Both sections are based on field re-
ports I contributed to a collaborative 
research project (Potthast 2002). 
3 The organisational context 
of the paper strip and of the 
empirical fieldwork 
The large technical system of air trans-
port has a remarkable record of avail-
ability. Air traffic has experienced local 
shut-downs due to bad weather condi-
tions, war or terrorist attacks, but it 
has never come to a global standstill.6 
How to account for the safety record of 
air traffic control? How to explain the 
small number of plane crashes air traf-
                                                             
6 In 1981, a strike of air traffic control 
brought the North-American airspace close 
to a complete halt (Nordlund 1998). 
Twenty years later, on 11 September 2001, 
the same continent came to its first stand-
still of civil air transport in history. Air 
traffic controllers were ordered to land 
about 4,500 planes in a few hours (9/11 
Commission 2004: 46). According to the 
9/11 report, among the authorities involved 
in responding to these terrorist attacks, air 
traffic control was the only agency that 
deserves praise for its performance. Carry-
ing out the unprecedented task of safely 
landing an enormous number of aircraft, 
"[t]hey have been superb" (ibid.: xvii). 
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fic control has been made responsible 
for? Although offering some insights to 
the organisational contexts of air traf-
fic control in Europe, the present sec-
tion does not yet provide an answer to 
this question but adds many aspects, 
which make the achievement of safety 
in air traffic look very unlikely. Pre-
supposing that readers are not familiar 
with the processes of air traffic control, 
the section is set up as a guided tour of 
this world, arranged in a conventional 
mode of ethnographic accounts. Its 
story-line is the biography of a re-
search and development project in 
which I have been involved, thus in-
cluding reflexive elements.  
The present contribution is based on 
ethnographic fieldwork and interviews 
carried out in the context of a larger 
international collaborative research 
project (named "LOOK"). Commis-
sioned by the Eurocontrol Experimen-
tal Centre, which long ago adopted the 
view that paper strips must be substi-
tuted, a large research consortium was 
established to prepare for a multi-
dimensional testing procedure. Sup-
posed to prepare grounds for a system-
atic comparison of different working 
positions in terms of safety, the project 
was expected to support the develop-
ment of digital control strips as a me-
dium of representation.7 Constructing 
                                                             
                                                                         
7 I was contacted by CETCOPRA (Centre de 
Recherche des Techniques, des Connais-
sances et des Pratiques), a Paris-based 
research group, to take part in this project. 
Firmly rooted in more than a decade of 
extensive fieldwork, CETCOPRA has estab-
lished an unusual blend of sociological and 
anthropological approaches to technology 
(cf. Bowker 1996). Ethnographic fieldwork 
has been carried out in the cockpits of civil 
and military aircraft (Moricot 1997, 2004); 
it has covered the development of new 
aircraft (Scardigli et al. 2000), aircraft 
maintenance (Moricot 2001), the innova-
tion of air traffic control systems (Poirot-
Delpech 1995) and their maintenance 
(Martin 2000). Sites of ethnographic in-
quiry further include air traffic control 
rooms (Vongmany 1998) and training fa-
cilities for pilots and air traffic control staff 
(Dubey 2001a, b). There is even an ethno-
graphic study devoted to working condi-
tions of cabin personnel accompanying 
a comparative simulation that delivers 
legitimate proof turns out to be a de-
manding task. It calls for a more thor-
ough investigation of the role of media 
of representation in critical situations 
(outlined in the previous section and 
carried out in section 4). 
3.1 First stop: Eurocontrol Ex-
perimental Centre 
The Eurocontrol Experimental Centre 
is located next to a former military 
airport at Brétigny. South of Paris, but 
badly connected to public transport, 
we are picked up at a local train station 
by an employee of Eurocontrol. It is 
the first time I have been in a car as-
signed diplomatic status. I am once 
more impressed with my first view of 
the research facilities of Eurocontrol. 
Having been the last to arrive at the 
research facilities, we are seated in a 
bright and modern conference room. 
Some twenty persons present them-
selves as experts in such fields as cog-
nitive sciences, ergonomics, informa-
tion sciences, human-machine interac-
tion. Their affiliations range from 
Paris-based university labs to univer-
sity hospitals, civil and military gov-
ernmental research organisations. The 
session is coordinated by two Eurocon-
trol researchers who start off with a 
surprisingly tight schedule for what 
they call a "multi-dimensionally vali-
dated simulation of different alterna-
tives of controller environment (paper 
strip, Digistrip and stripless)".8 Later 
in the discussion, the official project 
long-haul travel (Dubey et al. 2000). Bring-
ing together some of these different profes-
sional and organisational perspectives on 
the operation of air transport, a first syn-
thesis study was published in 1994: "Faced 
with automation: The pilot, the controller 
and the engineer" (Gras et al. 1994, cf. Gras 
1989). About the same time, extending 
towards more theoretical and historical 
ambitions, "Grandeur et dependence" 
(Gras 1993, cf. Gras 1997) became the 
French contribution to the then emergent 
approach on "Large Technical Systems" 
(Joerges 1988). 
8 See Eurocontrol Experimental Centre 
Annual Reports (2000: 33, 2001, 2002) 
and Grau et al. (2003). 
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title is shortened and referred to sim-
ply as "the simulation". 
During a break, I meet Mr H. who is 
closely familiar with the Digistrip de-
velopment project. Thanks to his ini-
tiative, I have an opportunity to be 
introduced to the then current version 
of Digistrip. It is basically a large touch 
screen modelled after the rack conven-
tional paper strips are placed on. In 
terms of flight data displayed, digital 
flight strips do not differ from the con-
ventions explained in the introductory 
section. Each digital strip contains 
information on a single flight. Placed 
in two rows on the rack (which is now a 
screen), digital strips can be sorted and 
re-sorted by slightly moving fingers on 
the surface of the screen. According to 
Mr H., the Digistrip and its screen con-
serve working routines that have de-
veloped around the paper strip. This 
includes registration of inscriptions 
written on the screen. What is more, 
Digistrip is equipped with a recogni-
tion program which identifies a num-
ber of symbols (numerals and charac-
ters). This is why Digistrip promises to 
close the information loop left open by 
paper strips as illustrated earlier.9
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3.2 Second stop: European skies 
as a political arena 
If successful, the simulation would 
take Eurocontrol's interest in replacing 
paper strips by digital flight strips a 
step further. Undeniably, the support-
ers of the digital strip have a salient 
argument. Provided that it comes with 
a reliable technology of script recogni-
tion (for instance of notations regard-
ing flight altitude, see introduction), 
digital flight strips would allow for a 
feedback of information into the sys-
tem in real-time. This, in turn, is seen 
as a considerable improvement in the 
level of interoperability within air traf-
fic control, a key mission for Eurocon-
trol.10 Table 1, comparing the organisa-
tion of European and North-American 
air traffic control services, is often used 
to illustrate the European challenge of 
ensuring interoperability.  
While being of comparable size and 
counting a comparable number of hub 
airports, the structure of European 
airspace is much more compartmental-
ised than its US counterpart. As shown 
by table 1, Europe has 47 organisations 
responsible for air traffic control (while 
the US have only one); 58 Upper Area US Europe 
irspace [million km2] 9,8 10,5 
ubs 31 27 
ivil and military air traffic control organisations 1 47 
pper Area Control centres 21 58 
perating systems 1 22 
rogram languages 1 30 
ir traffic control costs per flight [US-$] 380 667 able 1: The divided European sky (source: Zetsche 2004) 
                                                          
                                                            
here is a range of developmental projects 
 digital strips attempting to conserve the 
vantages of paper-based environments 
ertz et al. 2000, Guichard 2001, Durso 
 al 2005). Digistrip has been developed 
 CENA (Centre d'Etudes de la Navigation 
érienne), a research centre of the French 
inistry of Transports, and has been re-
anded "Vigiestrip" (Pavet et al. 2006).  
 
10 At an early stage, Eurocontrol had to 
abandon its initial mission to create a sin-
gle European sky. Having reframed its 
mission since then, it now cares for the 
interoperability of a European airspace 
which continues to be divided. Both, the 
history of divided skies (Bremer 1976), and 
the interrelated history of Eurocontrol 
(Eurocontrol 1993-2003), are still waiting 
to be analysed in detail. 
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Control centres in Europe compare 
with only 21 in the US. European con-
trol centres employ 22 different oper-
ating systems and 30 different pro-
gram languages. In the US, there is 
only one operating system and one 
programming language. Reportedly, 
these differences are reflected by the 
respective costs. Air traffic control 
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Among others, the centre of Karlsruhe 
was expected to send controllers to 
take part in the simulation to be ar-
ranged by the research consortium, 
commissioned by Eurocontrol. This is 
why I was invited to do ethnographic 
fieldwork at this particular centre. Fur-
thermore, I had the opportunity to 
accompany Gérard, member of the  
igure 2: Horizontal and vertical organisation of Air Traffic Control in Germany (source: DFS
997) 
osts in Europe amount to 667 US-
ollars per flight. In the US, the price 
f a safe flight is 380 Dollars. This dif-
erence in costs is very significant con-
idering that the German airspace 
lone accounts for three million flights 
er year. 
igure 2 shows how the German air-
pace is organised. Vertically, it is di-
ided up into an upper and a lower 
lice; in its horizontal extension, it is 
plit up between a number of geo-
raphical sectors. Figure 3 shows the 
pper area sector controlled by the 
entre of Karlsruhe ("Rhein Radar"). 
CETCOPRA team, spending several 
days at the Upper Area Control centre 
of Reims. 
3.3 Third stop: The repetition of 
critical incidents 
During this field trip, we meet an ex-
perienced controller who has recently 
provoked a near-miss. He takes us with 
him to a working position the only 
purpose of which is to recapitulate 
critical incidents. Together we are 
watching the short critical sequence, 
again and again. Unsurprisingly, we 
struggle to seize the severity of the 
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 Figure 3: Flights controlled by the Upper Area Control Centre of Karlsruhe (source: DFS
1997); the charts show flight paths, colour-coded by departures (red), arrivals (green) and
en route flights (blue) 
 
 
igure 4: Conflict alert message displayed by air traffic control radar screen
http://www.eurocontrol.int/muac/public/ standard_page/PDphotoGallery.html, download-
ed 20 Nov. 07); see also the Atlanta Terminal Approach Control centre which provides live
onitoring online (http://atcmonitor.com/, latest view on 30 March 2008) 
situation for its representation, by ra-
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situation for its representation, by ra-
dar images and recorded radio calls, 
remains rather distant and virtual. 
The two needles highlighted in red (cf. 
figure 4) represent two aircrafts which 
are flying at the same altitude (36.000 
feet). As they are calculated to arrive at 
the same time at a point of intersec-
tion, air traffic control needs to step in 
and handle the potential "conflict". The 
emphasis on paper strips should not 
obscure the fact that air traffic control 
is also based on radar screens. Control-
lers are provided with a double repre-
sentation of their area of responsibility. 
As stated before, there are always two 
controllers in charge of a sector. On 
average and during the daytime, they 
have to simultaneously keep an eye on 
about 15 flights. 
On the radar screen, each flight is rep-
resented by a needle indicating the 
direction of the aircraft (cf. figure 5). 
The length of the needle correlates 
with the speed of the aircraft. Calling 
"DLH123", the controller can establish 
radio contact with the pilot. "330", 
once again, indicates the current flight 
level, and "<F" tells the controller that 
the plane has started in Frankfurt.  
 
Figure 5: Representation of an aircraft by
air traffic control radar screen 
3.4 Fourth stop: The division of 
technical support 
Arriving at the Karlsruhe centre, I am 
met by Mr. L., a former controller who 
is now managing the technical support 
division. He describes his job as a con-
stant challenge consisting of two tasks: 
first, to stay close enough to everyday 
operations to understand its manifold 
requirements; and second, to carefully 
guide the centre through the inevitable 
technological improvements. Carrying 
out this task, he has to mediate be-
tween two spheres of activity both of 
which tend to be closed worlds. While 
many centres have been trapped in a 
process of divorcing "operations peo-
ple" from "technical people", Mr. L. 
claims that Karlsruhe was lucky to es-
cape this separatist trap: For a particu-
lar historical reason, it is the only 
German centre to have an in-house 
development team. This team is said to 
have "grown up" with the system and 
taken care of its development for dec-
ades. All interviewees confirm this 
view. Following the path of in-house 
technological development and locally 
adapted implementation, the 
Karlsruhe centre is presumed to have a 
long-term regional advantage. 
3.5 Fifth stop: Control room 
Inside the control room, I am often 
reminded of Mr. L.'s motto. He needs 
to do everything in order to prevent the 
controllers' sense of safety from being 
negatively affected. This implies adher-
ing to high standards of transparent 
communication and avoiding any kind 
of behaviour, which could lead to bar-
riers of communication or mutual 
blame. Most importantly, controver-
sies about the right path of technologi-
cal development must be kept out of 
the control room. 
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In a word, the operations room must 
be free of conflict – and this indeed is 
the case! Whenever I am in the control 
room, during day or night shifts, con-
trollers behave towards each other at a 
strikingly high level of professional 
sincerity. There is no sign of ambiguity 
or aggression. The rules of socially 
competent and fair behaviour seem to 
be clear and undisputed. It adds to this 
impression of sincerity that no oppor-
tunity is missed to greet each other and 
to shake hands. Whoever visits the 
control room, for whatever purpose, is 
carefully introduced. 
In many respects, the control room 
was quite accessible for carrying out an 
ethnographic program which I have 
developed elsewhere (Potthast 2007: 
87ff.). Within the flow of work prac-
tices, there are moments of increased 
attention. These are easily distinguish-
able from routine action. Signals of 
increased attention and nervousness 
multiply; lowered voices; curt phone 
calls ("call you back!"); requests for 
repeating messages. A control team 
facing a difficult situation is often 
joined by colleagues standing behind 
them and observing what is happening. 
In such cases, they stay at arm's length 
and act in a perfectly unobtrusive 
manner. If asked, they are capable of 
explaining what has happened. 
Figure 6: Air traffic control room (source: DFS 1997) 
Notwithstanding these informal gath-
erings, air traffic control is carried out 
by teams comprised of two persons. 
Each team is in charge of a geographi-
cal sector and provided with two dif-
ferent modes of representations. On 
the one hand, there are radar screens, 
on the other hand, each of the working 
positions ("suites") has paper strips 
placed on a rack. When a new paper 
strip comes in, it is put on the rack 
according to two simple basic rules. 
First, it is placed next to those flights 
heading for the same (few) points of 
intersection. The second principle of 
the sorting order is simply chronologi-
cal. Following both principles, strips 
are constantly re-grouped. As de-
scribed earlier, some flights need to be 
coordinated. In this case, changes of 
direction, altitude or speed are written 
on the respective flight strip.  
Finally, there are distinct job descrip-
tions for the two positions of a control 
team. Placed on the left side (cf. figure 
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igure 7: Air traffic control "suite" (source: DFS 1997); a typical air traffic control working
osition is designed for two persons and equipped with radar screens and a rack for flight
rogress strips ("Kontrollstreifen") in the middle; there is a controller position on the left and
 coordinator position on the right 
), "The radar controller is in charge of 
dentifying and maintaining the desti-
ation of flights. He has to (…) declare 
learances and give orders to ensure 
hat minimum separation between 
ircraft is respected at every time and 
o document these activities on the 
light strips" (DFS 1997: 4; my transla-
ion). To his right, "the coordination's 
ontroller is in charge of collecting and 
istributing information. He approves 
n taking over flights from adjacent 
ectors and is in charge of the handing 
ver by radar. Based on control strips, 
e produces and keeps an up to date 
mage of the traffic situation. He an-
ounces potential violations to mini-
um separation to the radar controller 
…)." (ibid.: 11; my translation). 
.6 Sixth stop: Seminar room 
f there is a single space in which the 
orlds of operations people and tech-
ical people overlap, it is the seminar 
ooms. Controllers are frequently re-
uested to attend presentations on 
diverse subjects related to their work, 
be it a future re-organisation of sector 
boundaries or the introduction of a 
new software package. Taking part in 
one of these seminars, actually on the 
introduction of "Reduced Vehicle 
Separation Minima" (RVSM), I am 
struck by the overly didactic and highly 
ironic style of presentation. In terms of 
atmosphere, it is hard to imagine a 
sharper contrast to the almost assidu-
ous sincerity encountered in the con-
trol room. The presenter anticipates 
this, delivering a remarkable perform-
ance of self-irony. His visual presenta-
tion consists of a close sequence of 
well-prepared didactic elements. How-
ever, permanently interrupting himself 
and commenting on every single didac-
tic clue, he makes it look ridiculous. 
The public clearly enjoys this perform-
ance. Participants are highly respon-
sive, and contribute funny remarks and 
comments throughout the presenta-
tion.  
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3.7 Seventh stop: The sudden end 
of a research project 
After its first year, the collaborative 
research project came to a sudden halt. 
Since then, only one out of three 
scheduled simulations did take place. 
The sudden end also implied that the 
project, conceptualized as a systematic 
comparison between work practices in 
different regional centres (i.e., the con-
tribution by CETCOPRA), had to be 
abandoned at an early stage.11  
Organised as a guided tour, the present 
section has told the story of an aban-
doned research and development pro-
ject, which aimed at replacing paper 
strips by digital strips. Pointing to the 
practical circumstances of the project 
rather than to particular uses of the 
paper strip, it has been shown that 
there are many reasons to doubt that 
paper strips will soon be replaced. Pro-
vided that the everyday production of 
air safety is deeply embedded in re-
gional exceptionalism and path de-
pendency, and given the delicate na-
ture of the relationships between op-
erations and technical development, it 
is a task of extraordinary complexity to 
build up a simulating and testing pro-
cedure, which is consistent and con-
sidered legitimate by all parties in-
volved. The next section will provide a 
more fine-grained analysis of this pic-
ture. 
4 Cycles of practical activi-
ties supported by paper 
How is it possible to reliably operate 
technical systems despite their being 
divided up between different media? 
As argued before, adjustment between 
                                                             
                                                            
11 The only reason provided for the decision 
to stop the project was a financial bottle-
neck caused indirectly by the attacks of 
9/11 (Dubey et al. 2002: 2). The budget of 
air traffic control is calculated on the 
amount of air traffic control charges paid 
by airlines. As a result of air traffic signifi-
cantly decreasing after 9/11, the revenues 
of air traffic control including Eurocontrol 
and its European Experimental Centre 
were also affected. 
different types of technology based on 
different types of media cannot be 
taken for granted. Instead, one may 
expect that this implies a permanent 
effort of mediation. "Because of their 
arbitrary nature, languages, bodily 
techniques and rituals seem to have a 
tightly restricted potential for accumu-
lating refinement and integration"12 
(Schüttpelz 2006: 104). The observa-
tions analysed in the present section 
focus on paper strips at the interface of 
extra-somatic and somatic technology. 
This is what ethnographic studies on 
air traffic control workplaces have usu-
ally done. Consequently, there are 
well-documented and detailed obser-
vations on the uses of paper strips. 
This has been crucial in developing a 
new understanding of how air safety is 
actively produced. However, revealing 
mediating practices has often re-
mained inconclusive. The present sec-
tion will therefore go beyond the habits 
of Workplace Studies and be more pre-
cise about the way practices are identi-
fied. It will do so by distinguishing 
different sets of practices by taking 
their cyclical (or recursive) nature as a 
common trait and the length and scope 
of cycles as a criterion for differentia-
tion. Interpreting the empirical mate-
rial with this analytical device, I have 
identified four sets of practices pre-
sented here in an ascendant order. To 
begin with, there are observations on 
the role of control strips for stabilising 
the shortest cycle of control activity. It 
is this cycle, which has attracted most 
attention by former research – at the 
expense of neglecting the other three.13
 
12 Translated by the author from the Ger-
man original.  
13 The basic material generated and ex-
plored in the following pages is about dif-
ferent life cycles of information. This is 
partly in accordance with an ethnographic 
convention which has been presented most 
comprehensively by Richard Harper 
(2000). It is surprising that while the au-
thor often compares different ethnographic 
studies on different subject areas, his "eth-
nographic program" seems to be built on 
the assumption that there is only one cycle 
of information per organisation. 
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4.1 Passage of a plane 
Using paper control strips, the work of 
air traffic control gains a dimension of 
physical experience. Control strips "are 
materialising" flight movements; and 
they do so "one by one" (Gruszow 
1999). Paper strips remind controllers 
of the trivial fact that each aircraft is a 
discrete entity. A paper strip put on a 
plastic slide and placed on the rack is a 
plane entering the control room. A 
similar observation can be made about 
a plane leaving the sector. To hand 
over a plane to an adjacent sector, the 
radar controller provides its pilot with 
the new radio frequency. Having re-
ceived confirmation he simultaneously 
says "bye-bye" to the pilot and throws 
away the paper strip. These two ges-
tures mark the beginning and the end 
of the shortest cycle of control prac-
tices. Within this cycle, there are vari-
ous activities which involve the ma-
nipulation of control strips. As de-
scribed above, the tasks of the two con-
trollers differ and are only loosely cou-
pled. At the same time, activities car-
ried out by the radar controller need to 
be intelligible for his or her colleague 
and vice versa. Activities directed at 
moving or marking paper strips are an 
efficient way to maintain this level of 
intelligibility. This is even more obvi-
ous as there seems to be no need for 
oral communication. While doing their 
work, controllers are rarely seen talk-
ing to each other. This is how paper 
strips work: they stabilise an arrange-
ment of parallel yet related activities. 
They bring about an element of scan-
sion and rhythm, which contrasts with 
the type of balanced attention required 
by watching radar screens. To use a 
favourite quote of a number of control-
lers: "Thanks to paper strips, control 
activities are palpable" ["greifbar"]. To 
give an example, a controller might put 
a paper strip slightly on the edge of the 
rack. This is to signal a potential con-
flict without having to interrupt or to 
wait for his colleague who is still carry-
ing out another task. Paper control 
strips stabilise passages of planes and 
are used as a medium of communica-
tion facilitating temporally deferred 
interactions between controllers.  
4.2 Hand-over 
Some of the partners contributing to 
the collaborative research project 
raised a fundamental criticism towards 
the selection of sequences decided to 
be relevant for a comparative simula-
tion. They expressed concern that 
situations in which paper strips matter 
most may turn out to be impossible to 
simulate. They argued that limiting 
simulations to a closed single "suite" 
(of two working positions) was an un-
justified design decision and a ques-
tionable limitation. Controllers in 
Karlsruhe would support this criticism. 
They report that paper strips are of 
particular importance when co-
presence (of two controllers, as de-
scribed in the previous paragraph) is 
interrupted. There is one type of inter-
ruption which occurs on a regular – 
and cyclical – basis: having worked for 
90 minutes, controllers are replaced 
for a break. A smooth hand-over pre-
supposes that a controller who is about 
to take over responsibility is capable to 
quickly grasp an overall picture of the 
current situation. This is when the pa-
per strips, sorted on a rack in a way as 
to anticipate potential conflicts, are 
often used. On several occasions, I 
have observed that, arriving at a con-
trol station, controllers use their fin-
gers in order to memorise the repre-
sentation of their flight sectors. Swiftly 
touching control strips one by one, and 
sometimes slightly changing their sort-
ing order, they seem to actively appre-
hend the situation. Shift work brings 
with it a second cycle of practices, 
which is not defined by paper strips 
but stabilised by their use in hand-over 
situations. 
4.3 Rite of passage 
The collection of paper strips serves as 
a mode of representation, which dupli-
cates the control system by radar. In 
case of emergency, it may also act as a 
medium of representation substituting 
for radar screens (cf. Hutchins 1995). 
This is a lesson many controllers have 
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learned by the end of their professional 
training: Out of the blue, their instruc-
tors would switch off the screen. This is 
a hard test which is said to shortly pre-
cede the veritable rite of passage of the 
"first release": the first time a control-
ler takes full responsibility of a geo-
graphical sector (Dubey 2001b: 173ff.). 
Members of the CETCOPRA research 
group reported that some instructors 
went on testing their former trainees 
by switching off the radar screens and 
enquiring about the location of planes 
on the basis of paper strips.14 These 
tests are events of high significance for 
they recall the rite of passage and 
thereby contribute to reproducing a 
specific pattern of relationship be-
tween more and less experienced con-
trollers. Concerning the issue of medial 
representation, re-enacting these tests 
may be regarded as a ritual of distrust. 
Faced with the test situation, control-
lers need to distance themselves from a 
particular medium of representation 
(namely radar screens) and to switch 
to the medium of paper strips for com-
pensation. As a result, they might re-
main somewhat suspicious of the radar 
screen. In other words, testing is a way 
of exposing the mediality of a medium. 
A rite of passage constitutes and is 
accompanied by a third set of cyclical 
practices. Also being stabilised by the 
use of paper strips, its life cycle is 
much longer than those identified in 
the previous paragraphs. By implica-
tion, first release experiences and tests 
are events which rarely happen. Statis-
tically speaking, they are low-
probability events. In order to under-
stand their significance, one needs to 
look more closely at the social pattern 
in responding to situations of high 
uncertainty. As illustrated above, con-
trollers may be responsible for causing 
a near-miss. Although this might hap-
pen only once in a controller's lifetime, 
controllers say they would always re-
call this event. More importantly, they 
report that to go through a troubling 
                                                                                                                         
14 Thanks to Gérard Dubey for sharing this 
observation. 
situation of high uncertainty is far 
from being a private experience. Con-
trollers claim to be aware of their col-
leagues (responsible for adjacent sec-
tors) being "in form" or struggling. 
This is why it does not come as a sur-
prise when a controller, unable to cope 
with a complex situation, calls out 
"stop!" Given the current design of air 
traffic control, managing (or failing to 
manage) situations of crisis will never 
be left unnoticed to colleagues. What is 
more, the collective dimension in re-
sponding to critical situations can be 
expected to result in a strong social 
and affective cohesion. According to 
the analyses of the CETCOPRA group, 
this is why social organisation in air 
traffic control centres takes the par-
ticular form of "clans" (Dubey 2001b: 
195). Following this interpretation, the 
rite of passage provides a model for 
how critical situations are managed. 
"The existence and the mediation of 
the collective compensates for the 
quasi-absence or the virtual presence 
of aircrafts. In other words, controllers 
catch up on the distance which sepa-
rates them from the sky and from the 
reality they are acting upon (…)"15 
(Dubey 2001a: 13).  
4.4 Generational change 
Interviewees at the Karlsruhe centre 
are convinced that Digistrip, as pre-
pared and tested by Eurocontrol, is 
incompatible with a future operation 
system all German air traffic control 
centres are waiting to be equipped 
with. This is why the Karlsruhe re-
gional centre would not openly opt for 
Digistrip. In the light of this macro-
political constellation, both the simula-
tion and the future of Digistrip do not 
look very promising. But interviewees 
also let me know that they are confi-
dent to find a way to locally develop a 
new version of Digistrip which would 
be adapted to the specific requirements 
of that centre. If this vision was im-
plemented, the Karlsruhe centre would 
 
15 Translated by the author from the French 
original. 
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again demonstrate its commitment to 
always opt for fully tailored solutions 
and never become dependent on ex-
ternal expertise. 
If asked whether Digistrip will be in-
troduced or not, interviewees answer 
by embedding this question into a lar-
ger political framework. Without going 
into details, these accounts help to 
explain why I did not come across a 
single voice of dissent or a single sign 
of resistance against the idea of turning 
paper strips into digital strips. It seems 
to be more important and a reason of 
confidence that the regional centre is 
able to integrate the issue of Digistrip 
into the particular Karlsruhe success 
story. If there was no doubt about the 
centre's exceptionalism, there would 
be no reason to worry. Confidence, 
however, is paired off with a gloomy 
picture. The local success story might 
soon come to an end as the generation 
that has developed the system from 
scratch, and has been in charge of its 
maintenance since then, is now close to 
retirement. Particularly, this applies to  
the head of the software development 
team who is said to personify the gen-
eration which grew up (with) the sys-
tem and who is said to "live the sys-
tem".  
The preceding paragraph on the "rite 
of passage" has dealt with an element 
which is part of the training of air traf-
fic controllers. It has to be said that in 
the age of simulators, this particular 
exercise looks as if it was part of an 
antiquated didactic repertoire. Observ-
ing changes in the process of training, 
controllers of the senior generation 
express a deep concern that the rise of 
the simulator comes with the demise of 
a more interactive professional train-
ing. They already feel surrounded by a 
new generation of controllers labelled 
"the Nintendo Generation". Members 
of this generation are said to be no 
longer rooted in aviation and therefore 
to be deprived of an appropriate cul-
tural orientation. Among those, who 
claim to have enjoyed full training, it is 
common to criticise that current train-
ing practices fail to take into account 
the interface between pilots and con-
trollers. To bring evidence to this criti-
cism they point to the fact that training 
sites, which once included airports, are 
now situated far out in the countryside. 
It should not come as a surprise, there-
fore, that younger colleagues no longer 
had a "system's perspective" as they 
had grown up and in a synthetic world. 
The younger generation is supposedly 
condemned to act in a synthetic world, 
which is said to "lack depth" and will 
neither object to digital strips nor de-
fend the Karlsruhe exceptionalism. 
Members of the older generation tes-
tify that they "cannot imagine working 
without paper strips". However, with a 
generation moving towards retirement, 
the paper strip will probably disappear. 
As opposed to the observations re-
ported and interpreted throughout the 
preceding paragraphs, generational 
change comes with a break in practices 
rather than with cyclical practices sta-
bilised by the use of a particular me-
dium of representation. 
5 Representing normal op-
erations 
As stated before, the central problem 
of coordination faced by centres of air 
traffic control is to adjust between cen-
tralised flight plans and the semi-
autonomous actual movements of 
planes.16 To carry out this task, air traf-
fic control draws on two distinct sets of 
representation. Its contribution to the 
production of air safety needs to be 
portrayed as a performance: flight con-
trol centres actively mediate between 
the order of plans and the order of ob-
served events. Far-spread activities are 
brought together, observed and coor-
dinated. This performance would not 
be that noteworthy if air safety was 
produced according to a superior har-
monious "logic of operation". However, 
                                                             
16 Although the introduction of TCAS, a 
cockpit-based "Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System", has by-passed air traf-
fic control, it seems to have further ampli-
fied this problem (cf. Weyer 2006, 2007: 
76ff.). 
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according to research on the large 
technical system of air transport, this 
assumption is erroneous. It seems to 
be more appropriate to think of air 
safety in terms of heterogeneous vi-
sions. Competing models of what is 
considered to be the perfect order have 
come to overlap (Gras 1993). Adher-
ents to different models can be identi-
fied by the way they conceive of and 
handle critical situations. On the one 
hand, one has to mention the model 
named after "Ikarus" (Gras et al. 1994). 
Claiming that the capacity for adapta-
tion and quick reaction by pilots is 
crucial to air safety, its basic principle 
is to protect the autonomy of pilots. On 
the other hand, this model sharply 
contrasts with a second one called 
"mechanical bird". To opt for the "me-
chanical bird" is to subscribe to the 
idea that there would be no risk of col-
lision if control was entirely delegated 
to ground-based planning and engi-
neering (ibid.). As indicated (and de-
spite the fact that the titles chosen may 
sound a little outdated), both models 
are internally consistent in cognitive, 
in normative, and in social terms. Both 
models need to be permanently bal-
anced, and this is precisely the task left 
to air traffic control (ibid.). To state it 
more dramatically, air traffic is in 
charge of the necessary linkages be-
tween the sky and the earth. Gras and 
his colleagues have concluded that the 
heterogeneous character of air trans-
portation must be taken seriously, 
whenever new technology is intro-
duced. In line with this argument, the 
present contribution systemically ex-
plored the coexistence of different me-
dia of representation and their implica-
tions for critical situations.  
How to explain high levels of reliability 
while taking into account a multiplicity 
of different media? Following a theo-
retical exposition, the analysis took 
two steps, drawing on ethnographic 
material. First, I documented a failed 
attempt to demonstrate the advantages 
of digital strips over paper strips. Sec-
ond, I presented a number of observa-
tions on practices that have co-evolved 
with the use of the paper strip. The 
first part of the analysis facilitated tak-
ing the second beyond the conventions 
of Workplace Studies. Having placed 
the paper strip in its organisational 
contexts in the first place, the analysis 
could be extended to practices of larger 
scale and scope. Thereby, I have es-
caped the scheme opposing "microso-
ciality" and "macrosociality".17 I have 
captured and characterised a maxi-
mum variety of practices all of which 
are related to different types of critical 
situations. Current initiatives to re-
place paper strips should be aware of 
their contribution to stabilise critical 
situations by closing the loop of cycli-
cal practices. Each cycle of practices 
has a critical point of transition. This 
has been particularly obvious in the 
case named "rite of passage". In this 
regard, I have pointed out that (older) 
controllers tend to shy away from me-
dial representations provided by radar 
screens. As described above, they re-
peatedly stage the mediality of this 
particular medium. Deliberately 
switching off monitors, they point to a 
potential for disruption and recall the 
difference between first and second 
order failures. This useful exercise in 
comparing dis/advantages of different 
media can no longer be reproduced 
once paper strips have become re-
placed by digital strips.  
The observations presented in this 
article do not provide evidence that 
paper strips are "irreplaceable". On the 
other hand, the analyses presented 
above do not support the following 
view. According to Digistrip propo-
nents, paper and paperless control are 
                                                             
17 Ethnographic studies on "situated action" 
tend to subscribe a microscopic research 
program. As examined by Conein and 
Jacopin (1994: 477), they often share two 
explanatory goals. On the one hand, they 
try to demonstrate that interaction with 
objects cannot be decontextualised, that is 
divorced from social interaction. Contrary 
to this, they seek to show that each form of 
knowledge or capacity is based on the use 
of resources which are part of its particular 
local environment. 
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no longer exclusive alternatives for 
technological development. The once 
declared objective of substituting the 
paper strip is said to have been re-
defined. In the meantime, all major 
centres for research and development 
have adopted a new objective and a 
new rhetoric, which stresses "integra-
tion" instead of "substitution". As the 
potentials of "integration" are con-
stantly being emphasised, paper strips 
have lost part of their backward repu-
tation. Even positive qualities - such as 
being palpable, durable and adaptable 
to extremely different situations - have 
been attributed to paper strips (Pavet 
et al. 2006: 55). However, while paper 
strips have undeniably been rehabili-
tated, all the qualities rediscovered 
relate to the smallest cycle of practices. 
What then about the remaining cycles 
of practices reproduced and stabilised 
with the help of paper strips? Control-
lers and engineers interviewed during 
the case study emphasise a "longue 
durée" perspective. Unremittingly, 
they give priority to observations, 
which refer to more extended cycles of 
practice. As stated earlier, they regard 
the Karlsruhe regional centre as a relict 
of a failed attempt to harmonise air 
traffic control on a European scale; a 
relict, which was then turned into a 
regional advantage. Given these 
macro-political framework conditions, 
there is no neutral space, which would 
allow for a purely technical simulation, 
comparing paper strips and other 
technical devices. The more this 
macro-political aspect is emphasised, 
the more unlikely it will be to find an 
easy path towards increased interop-
erability. 
Based on ethnographic fieldwork and 
interviews in air traffic control centres, 
the present analysis has drawn atten-
tion to multiple sets of practices, which 
differ in scale and scope. However, it 
does not provide an answer to the fun-
damental questions emerging in the 
course of this inquiry: How do differ-
ent sets of practices relate to each 
other? How to conceive of their rela-
tionship? For instance, how to bring 
together the two perspectives sketched 
in the previous paragraphs, stressing 
either short or long cycles? To deliber-
ately leave this question open is to in-
sist on the need for respecting differ-
ences between practices which have co-
evolved with the uses of paper strips. 
Knowing more about the multidimen-
sional uses of paper strips (cf. Vong-
many 1998: 67) does not offer immedi-
ate practical advice. But still, there is a 
suggestion addressing practitioners 
inasmuch as that the present analysis 
presupposes and nourishes processes 
of organisational learning. In this 
sense, it shares the ambitions of the 
approach on highly reliable organisa-
tions (Hale et al. 1997, Bourrier 2002). 
As it is unlikely that organisations will 
learn from large crises and dramatic 
accidents, social studies of technology 
and risk should continue to invest in 
research on normal operations. 
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